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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
This case concerns the contractual meaning of the 
word “renewal.”  F&M Equipment, Ltd., f/k/a Furnival 
Machinery Company and Indian Harbor Insurance Company 
agreed to a ten-year insurance policy that included a promise 
by Indian Harbor to offer a renewal.  At the end of the ten 
years, Indian Harbor offered a “renewal” contract with 
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substantially different terms to Furnival, which rejected it.  
Indian Harbor sought a declaratory judgment that its contract 
offer constituted a renewal and Furnival counterclaimed for 
breach of the original contract.  The District Court denied 
Furnival’s summary judgment motion, holding that Indian 
Harbor’s offer constituted a renewal because an insurance 
company need only notify the insured that a policy will 
change for the later offer of a contract to constitute a renewal.  
Furnival now appeals.  For the foregoing reasons, we will 
vacate the judgment of the District Court. We conclude that, 
for a contract to be considered a renewal, it must contain the 
same, or nearly the same, terms as the original contract. 
 
I. 
 In December 2001, Furnival and Indian Harbor agreed 
to a Pollution and Remediation Legal Liability Policy.  The 
Policy is a seventy-four page document detailing the terms 
and conditions of the insurance coverage offered by Indian 
Harbor.  The terms and conditions include:  (1) $10 million in 
liability protection; (2) insurance coverage for twelve specific 
Furnival locations; and (3) a ten-year period of coverage from 
the purchase date.  One of the sites covered by the Policy is 
the Elizabethtown Landfill Site, which Furnival was obligated 
to clean up pursuant to a consent decree with the federal 
government.  Indian Harbor knew about the consent decree at 
the time the Policy was issued.  The Policy also includes a 
separate section for “Endorsements.”  Endorsement No. 16 
lists five reasons for which Indian Harbor may “refuse to 
offer a renewal extension of coverage,” and states that 
Indian Harbor “shall not cancel nor non-renew this Policy 
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except for the reasons stated above.”1  It is undisputed that 
none of the listed reasons for non-renewal occurred. 
                                              
1 Endorsement No. 16 reads in relevant part: 
 
I. The INSURED and the Company agree 
that the Company may cancel at any 
time or refuse to offer a renewal 
extension of coverage for the following 
reasons: 
 
a. the INSURED has made a material 
misrepresentation . . .[ ; or] 
 
b. the INSURED materially breaches . 
. . ; or 
 
c. material failure on the part of the 
INSURED to comply with Policy 
terms, conditions, or contractual 
duties; or 
 
d. a material change in the operations 
or lack of operations performed by 
the INSURED. . .. 
 
II. Furthermore, the INSURED and the 
Company agree that the Company may 
refuse to offer a renewal extension of 
coverage to the INSURED for the 
following reason: 
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In 2001, Furnival paid Indian Harbor a $520,498 
premium for the Policy and accompanying Endorsements.  In 
June 2006, the parties modified the contract to include 
Endorsement No. 23, which increased the Policy’s limit from 
$10 million to $14 million for an additional premium of 
$55,798. 
 
In September 2011, near the end of the initial coverage 
period, Indian Harbor sought a renewal application from 
Furnival.  On December 30, 2011, Furnival requested that 
Indian Harbor provide Furnival with “[p]roposed premiums 
payable and all other relevant terms and conditions for a 
renewal policy that the named insured is entitled to and 
allowed to elect under the policy.”  In late January 2012, 
Indian Harbor sent Furnival’s insurance broker its version of 
a renewal offer (the Indication of Coverage).  The Indication 
provided $5 million of coverage over a one-year term, and 
omitted coverage for Elizabethtown, the only previously 
insured site for which Furnival had made a claim.  Unsatisfied 
with the terms of the Indication, Furnival rejected it and, two 
days later, requested that Indian Harbor send an offer to 
                                                                                                     
a. loss of reinsurance or a substantial 
decrease in reinsurance has 
occurred. . .. 
 
The Company agrees that it shall not cancel 
nor non-renew this Policy except for the 
reasons stated above. 
 
All other terms and conditions remain the 
same. 
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renew under the same terms and conditions as the Policy.  On 
January 31, 2012, Indian Harbor informed Furnival that it 
would not provide a revised offer.  In February 2012, 
Furnival sent Indian Harbor a notice accepting “the renewal 
extension that Indian Harbor was obligated to offer under 
Endorsement No. 16,” along with a check for $520,498 to 
serve as the premium for the renewed Policy.  Indian Harbor 
returned the check and rejected Furnival’s request. 
 
On March 23, 2012, Indian Harbor filed a Complaint 
against Furnival, seeking declaratory judgment on four issues:  
 
(1) [Indian Harbor] made an offer to renew the 
Policy as required by Endorsement No. 16;  
(2) Furnival rejected [Indian Harbor]’s offer to 
renew the Policy, resulting in its termination 
on December 31, 2011;  
(3) [Indian Harbor] had no obligation to offer to 
renew the Policy under the same terms and 
conditions as the expiring Policy; and  
(4) Furnival’s attempt to renew the Policy under 
the same terms and conditions as the 
expiring Policy is without force and effect. 
 
Furnival filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, and 
eventually moved for summary judgment. 
   
The District Court denied Furnival’s motion.  Indian 
Harbor argued, as it does here, that state law permits an 
insurance company to renew a policy with different terms 
than the original policy if notice of the changes is given.  The 
District Court reasoned that Furnival “inadvertently 
acknowledged” that the “general rule of ‘same terms and 
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conditions as contained in the original policy,’” contains an 
“‘unless otherwise expressed’ exception.”2  Accordingly, as 
Indian Harbor undisputedly gave notice of its intent to change 
the policy, the court held that Indian Harbor satisfied its 
obligation to renew.  
 
II.3 
This Court reviews the district court’s denial of 
summary judgment de novo.4  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5  This 
Court “exercise[s] plenary review over questions of contract 
interpretation.”6 
 
Sitting in diversity, we apply the law of the state in 
which the case originates, in this case Pennsylvania.  “Under 
Pennsylvania law, an insurance contract is governed by the 
law of the state in which the contract was made.”7  In 
Pennsylvania, “[t]he fundamental rule in interpreting the 
                                              
2 Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. F & M Equip. Ltd., No. 2:12-CV-
01506 PBT, 2013 WL 4405685, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 
2013). 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 648 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
5 Id. 
6 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Norwin Sch. Dist., 544 F.3d 229, 243 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
7 Meyer, 648 F.3d at 162 (citing Crawford v. Manhattan Life 
Ins. Co., 221 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966)).  
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meaning of a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the contracting parties.”8  Where writing is “clear 
and unequivocal,” the intent of the parties is found “in the 
writing itself . . ..  A contract contains an ambiguity if it is 
reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable 
of being understood in more than one sense.”9  Specifically, 
insurance contracts must be interpreted in light of the 
insured’s reasonable expectations.10  If an ambiguity is 
otherwise unresolvable, inferences should be drawn against 
the insurance company, the author of the policy.11 
 
We must determine what the parties meant when they 
agreed that Indian Harbor would not “refuse to offer a 
renewal extension of coverage.”12  Furnival argues that a 
“renewal” requires a new contract that contains the same 
material terms as, or substantially similar terms to, the 
original contract.13  Indian Harbor responds that such a rule 
                                              
8 Murphy v. Duquesne Univ., 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001). 
9 Id. 
10 Bensalem Twp. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 
1303, 1308-09 (3d Cir. 1994). 
11 Meyer, 648 F.3d at 163. 
12 Furnival and Indian Harbor argue that the phrases “renewal 
extension” and “renewal extension of coverage” respectively 
have independent meanings that happen to align with their 
interpretations of the word “renewal.”  We do not believe that 
the additional words provide useful clues as to the meaning of 
the operative word “renewal.” 
13 See, e.g., Borders v. Great Falls Yosemite Ins. Co., 72 Cal. 
App. 3d 86, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Gaston-Lincoln Transit, 
Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 S.E.2d 211, 216 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1973).  Indian Harbor characterizes Furnival’s argument 
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would lock it into the same contract for eternity, and that 
cannot be what the parties intended.  For its part, Indian 
Harbor argues that a renewal need only be any offer of a new 
contract, so long as advance notice is provided for any 
changed terms and the terms are commercially reasonable.  
Furnival responds that this argument renders the promise of 
renewal illusory, because Indian Harbor is always free to 
offer a new contract, and its reasoning allows it to offer a 
“renewal” that is of no use to Furnival. 
 
Case law on this subject is quite thin.  Neither we nor 
the Pennsylvania courts have considered the meaning of 
renewal in this context.  In Flanagan v. Fidelity Bank, the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a 
certificate of deposit (CD) that automatically renewed after its 
expiration continued accruing interest at its original rate.14  
The court held that, because the CD renewed, the original 
interest rate applied, rather than either zero interest or market 
rates.  In so holding, the court relied on Black’s Law 
Dictionary:  “To ‘renew’ a contract means to begin again or 
continue in force the old contract.”15  But that court did not 
consider whether modifications to a contract would render it a 
nonrenewal.  If the bank had notified the customer that the 
CD would change to a new market rate upon its expiration, 
                                                                                                     
as requiring a renewal to have identical terms.  In its brief, 
however, Furnival uses the phrases “same material terms” and 
“substantially the same terms” interchangeably, relying on 
cases that use both.  For the purpose of our analysis, we treat 
them as separate concepts. 
14 652 A.2d 930, 932 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
15 Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., quoted in Flanagan, 652 
A.2d at 932. 
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there is no evidence that the court would have considered it a 
nonrenewal.  Similarly, if a landlord “renews” a tenant’s lease 
at a new market rate, is that not also a renewal?  A renewal 
contract need not contain identical terms to the original.16 
 
Indian Harbor, for its part, points to Schock v. Penn 
Township Mutual Fire Insurance Association, where the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that “[a] renewal of a 
policy of . . . insurance is, in effect, a new contract of 
insurance, and, unless otherwise expressed, on the same terms 
and conditions as the original policy.”17  Indian Harbor seeks 
a rule that any new contract with notice of new terms 
qualifies as a renewal.  But case law states only that, if an 
insurance company renews a contract and wants to change 
terms, it must give notice of the change or the terms will be 
the same.  Neither case law nor logic suggests that notice 
implies that such a new contract is a renewal.  Imagine an 
insurance company that initially agreed to a 100-year contract 
with a promise of renewal and subsequently gives notice that 
the “renewal” runs for thirty days.  We would be hard pressed 
                                              
16 See Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Continisio, 17 F.3d 62, 
65 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A] change in material terms [does not 
necessarily] constitute[] constructive nonrenewal of an 
insurance policy.”); Stowe Twp. v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of 
Ind., 507 F.2d 1332, 1337 (3d Cir. 1975) (surveying 
“renewal” insurance contracts with terms different than the 
original). 
17 24 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (emphasis added).  
Indian Harbor also notes that Gaston-Lincoln Transit, on 
which Furnival relies, contains similar language, that 
“substantially the same terms” apply on renewal “absent 
notice to the contrary.”  201 S.E.2d at 216. 
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to consider that a renewal.  Tellingly, the cases on which 
Indian Harbor relies consider whether a new insurance policy 
may change terms at all, rather than asking whether the 
change in terms is so drastic as to render it effectively a 
nonrenewal.18  While the terms of a renewal contract may 
change with notice, the key question is how similar the new 
contract must be, and whether the Indication here meets that 
standard. 
 
Regardless of the particular degree of similarity 
required, Indian Harbor’s position cannot be what the parties 
intended.19  There is no difference between what Indian 
Harbor proposes and what it had every right to do without a 
prior promise to renew.  If any new offer counts as a renewal, 
the promise of a renewal is illusory:  Indian Harbor may 
easily satisfy its obligation by offering a contract which it 
knows does not satisfy Furnival’s needs.  Indian Harbor 
argues that the common law duty of good faith and fair 
dealing provides a backstop that would prevent commercially 
unreasonable insurance contracts.  But the relevant provision 
of the contract is a promise to offer a renewal, not a 
reasonable insurance contract.  The common law duty, 
therefore, merely reinforces the idea that Indian Harbor 
cannot satisfy its obligation by offering a renewal that it 
knows Furnival will decline.  It does not further explicate 
what constitutes a “good faith” renewal offer. 
                                              
18 Continisio, 17 F.3d at 66 (“[I]f an insured accepts coverage 
on different terms, with knowledge of the change in coverage, 
a valid renewal could exist.”). 
19 Murphy 777 A.2d at 429 (ascertaining the parties’ intent is 
the fundamental rule of contractual interpretation). 
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On the question of what constitutes a renewal, it is 
clear under our precedent that a renewal need not be identical 
to the original.20  But to hold that it can be any modification 
at all would not give effect to the parties’ intentions.  In 
McCuen v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, 
the Eighth Circuit considered a situation similar to the one 
presented here:  a new insurance contract with terms 
“substantially and materially different from the policy then in 
effect.”21  The McCuen court reasoned that “[r]efusing to 
provide coverage and refusing to renew coverage are not 
identical concepts. . ..  [The insurer] did not refuse to provide 
(deny) any coverage at all, it simply refused to provide the 
same coverage as was provided under the existing policy—it 
refused to renew.”22  The court held that a renewal requires 
“continuation of coverage on the same, or nearly the same, 
terms as the policy being renewed.”23  We agree with the 
McCuen court and believe that this rule best accords with the 
intentions of the parties. 
 
III. 
The Indication differed from the Policy in four ways:  
1) an updated price; 2) one year of coverage instead of ten; 3) 
$5 million coverage limit instead of $14 million; 4) exclusion 
                                              
20 Continisio, 17 F.3d at 65. 
21 946 F.2d 1401, 1404 (8th Cir. 1991). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. (citing Davis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 196 N.W.2d 526, 
530 (Iowa 1972)).  The court ostensibly followed Iowa law, 
but Davis actually stated that unless otherwise expressed, the 
terms must be the same.  The McCuen court added flexibility 
in holding that a renewal could be “nearly the same” as well. 
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of Elizabethtown.  As discussed above, a reasonable change 
in price should not alone render a new contract a nonrenewal.  
But the remaining terms must be recognizable extensions of 
the initial Policy, and they are not.  The length of coverage is 
different, the amount of coverage is different, and the scope 
of coverage is different.  The general subject matter is the 
same and the parties are the same, but this is not enough.  
Because Indian Harbor did not offer a contract that is either 
the same or nearly the same as the Policy, it breached its 
promise to offer a renewal extension of coverage. 
 
While Indian Harbor breached, Furnival was not 
entitled to merely send Indian Harbor a check for $520,498 
because Indian Harbor need not have offered an identical 
policy.  Furthermore, after the 2006 modification to add 
Endorsement No. 23, that premium was no longer even 
accurate.  Per Endorsement No. 16, Indian Harbor must offer 
a contract that can be considered a renewal, and then the 
parties can negotiate the details. 
 
Indian Harbor complains that holding it to its promise 
would require renewing the renewal provision itself, and that 
would obligate Indian Harbor to recursively renew the 
contract in perpetuity.  To the extent Indian Harbor argues 
that a contract it drafted was not careful enough, we are 
unmoved.  Moreover, in future policies, Indian Harbor need 
not incorporate the broad renewal provisions that are included 
here.  The issue of a perpetual contract is, however, a 
question for another day.  We hold here only that the terms of 
a renewal must be the same or nearly the same as the initial 
contract.  The question of being held to a perpetual renewal is 
not before us and we will not opine on such a question at this 
time.   
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IV. 
For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court and remand this case to the 
District Court to order summary judgment in favor of 
Furnival on the issue of Indian Harbor’s breach and for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
